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Resum 
 
D’ençà l’aparició de les primeres xarxes peer-to-peer, el seu nombre d’usuaris 
no ha cessat de créixer com a conseqüència dels beneficis que presenten en 
comparació amb les altres arquitectures alternatives per a la compartició i 
distribució de contingut multimèdia. Tanmateix, atesa la seva natura 
distribuïda, poden experimentar un important problema de mal ús: el free-
riding. El free-riding consisteix en que alguns usuaris consumeixin recursos 
sense contribuir al sistema. Aquest comportament no només no és just per a la 
resta d’usuaris, sinó que també amenaça l’èxit d’aquest tipus de xarxes. 
 
Amb la motivació de posar fi a aquesta conducta van aparèixer els 
mecanismes d’incentius, que proporcionen al sistema un mètode per a 
incentivar els nodes i, així, aconseguir que comparteixin els seus recursos amb 
la resta d’usuaris. En altres paraules, ofereixen a la xarxa la justícia necessària 
per tal que tots els usuaris gaudeixin de bon rendiment. 
 
Aquest projecte està organitzat en dues parts principals. En la primera s’ha 
realitzat un estudi exhaustiu sobre l’estat de l’art en relació als mecanismes 
d’incentius que ha donat com a resultat una classificació segons les 
característiques dels algoritmes estudiats. Aquest estudi proporciona al lector 
una primera visió de les fortaleses i debilitats de cada algoritme. En la segona 
part s’ha construït un escenari de test basat en la virtualització de màquines 
que ha servit per a avaluar empíricament alguns dels algoritmes estudiats. 
Finalment s’han realitzat una sèrie d’experiments per a comparar 
determinades característiques d’aquests algoritmes i, d’aquesta manera, s’ha 
pogut confirmar o desmentir les conclusions fruit de l’estudi de l’estat de l’art. 
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Overview 
 
 
Since the first peer-to-peer communities appeared, their number of users has 
increased considerably owing to the benefits they offer compared to their 
alternative architectures in the sharing and distribution of multimedia content. 
However, due to its distributed nature, they can suffer an important problem of  
misuse: free-riding. Free-riding consists on users consuming resources without 
contributing to the system. Such behaviour not only is not fair for the rest of the 
users, but also threatens the success of this type of nets. 
 
With the motivation to avoid free-riding, the mechanisms of incentives were 
born. They provide the system with a method to motivate the nodes and make 
them share their resources with the other users. In one word, they provide the 
net with the needed fairness to achieve a good performance for all users. 
 
This thesis is organised in two main parts. In the first part there is a  
comprehensive study of the state of the art regarding the incentive 
mechanisms, resulting in a classification depending on the characteristics of 
the studied algorithms. That study provides the reader with a first sight of the 
strengths and weaknesses of each algorithm. In the second part there is a test 
scenario based in the virtualization of machines that was useful to evaluate 
empirically some of the studied algorithms. Finally, a series of experiments 
were carried out in order to compare some characteristics of these algorithms 
and thus verify or deny the conclusions resulted in the study of the state of the 
art. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Since the first peer-to-peer communities appeared, the use of such nets has 
increased considerably, becoming more and more popular. However, they 
suffer from a fundamental problem of unfairness due to the fact that many users 
in these communities try to use these network resources while they contribute 
little or not at all. Providing the net with the needed mechanisms so that it is fair 
for all its users is needed for the success of these networks. 
 
Today there are numerous peer-to-peer nets with different algorithms of 
incentives using a range of mechanisms. Therefore, the motivation of this 
master thesis is to study and present in a clearly way these algorithms and 
accomplish an experimental studio which will confirm or deny the benefits 
provided by each algorithm. 
 
The peer-to-peer technologies and the incentives for the peers are presented in 
the first chapter, as well as an analysis of the existing methods and problems to 
be solved by the algorithms related to security and performance. After that, the  
two main objectives to be accomplished during this thesis will be tackled. The 
first objective of this master thesis is to analyse the state of the art related to the 
different existing algorithms detailing their characteristics and profits according 
to their authors, and provide a classification by characteristics of the algorithms. 
The second important goal is to build an scenario where different peer-to-peer 
algorithms could be experimentally tested and compared. Those scenarios 
should be capable to obtain experimental results allowing to compare several 
algorithms among others and confirm the results obtained in the theoretic 
comparative. Finally, it is pretended to verify or deny the presumed profits 
provided by each algorithm. 
 
This master thesis is organized into five chapters: 
 
An introduction to peer-to-peer technology is provided in the first chapter. It 
describes what that technology is, the different types of existing peer-to-peer 
networks and the motivation of its existence. Then it is compared with other 
existing paradigms in existing networks. Related to the incentive mechanisms, 
there is an explanation about what they are and why they are necessary. 
Finally, the key concepts of incentive mechanisms are defined for a proper 
understanding. 
 
The second chapter contains an analysis of the detail of the state of the art in 
terms of incentive mechanisms. It presents the classification most widely 
accepted within the research communities in incentive mechanisms based on 
how they work. Each algorithm is presented giving its features and compared 
among the others in order to identify the strengths and weakness of each of 
them. 
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The third chapter corresponds to the beginning of the experimental part. After 
the state of the art research some of the algorithms are tested to obtain an 
experimental view of the algorithm performance. That will confirm or deny the 
features and strengths presented by their authors in their papers. In this chapter 
the technologies and scenario used to carry on that test 
beds are presented. 
 
The fourth chapter presents the results of the experimental works comprised by 
several testbeds. In this experimental part, the fairness, the resilience to 
strategic clients and the convergence time are the features tested. 
 
Finally in the fifth chapter the conclusions obtained during all the study are 
evaluated. 
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CHAPTER 1. PEER-TO-PEER COMMUNITIES 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
In the beginning of the first computer networks the client-server architecture 
was the predominant. In such networks, clients consume information from a 
single server. In the course of time, new technologies and new multimedia 
contents appeared. This lead to new user needs. This kind of information 
caused an exponential increase of the size of the information to be transferred. 
Along with that, the content sharing evolved from a paradigm of a few 
information sources with many clients to a new paradigm where all the users 
create and consume contents. 
 
In this new scenario, the first peer-to-peer communities began to grow because 
it provides new features and capabilities to make more efficient to share and 
distribute multimedia information. This new architecture fits better to the new 
scenario and provides several benefits such as load balancing, performance 
improvement and fault tolerance by decentralization, among others. However, it 
also brings new problems due to the decentralization. For instance, new 
security issues. 
 
 
Client - Server Peer-to-peer
 
 
Figure 1.1: Client – Server versus Peer-to-peer architecture 
 
 
From the beginning, these issues have been tried to be solved and therefore 
the peer-to-peer system has enhanced a lot. Additionally new features and 
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information formats have led to new specific peer-to-peer systems like peer-to-
peer live video broadcasting. 
 
 
1.2. What is a Peer-to-peer Network? 
 
A peer-to-peer computer network is one in which each computer in the network 
can act as a client or server for the other computers in the network, allowing 
shared access to various resources such as files, peripherals and sensors 
without the need for a central server [27]. 
 
Nowadays many different peer-to-peer networks exist. Each one of them 
requires that all the computers in the network use a compatible software using 
the same protocol to connect to each other and access to the resources found 
on other computers. Peer-to-peer networks can be used for sharing content 
such as audio, video, data or anything in digital format. 
 
Peer-to-peer file transfer protocols provide more scalable architectures for 
distributing large files than the traditional server-client paradigm. The idea is 
that the peers that are downloading also contribute uploading to the system, 
thus scaling the available bandwidth as more peers join the system. Even 
centralized services with large network connections can be overwhelmed by a 
large number of clients, while peer-to-peer services can ostensibly continue to 
scale, even in extreme scenarios. 
 
Peer-to-peer content distribution systems range from relatively simple direct file 
sharing applications, to more sophisticated systems that create a distributed 
storage infrastructure for securely and efficiently publishing, organizing, 
indexing, searching, updating and retrieving data. 
 
Peer-to-peer systems often implement an abstract overlay network, built at 
Application Layer. Such overlays are used for indexing and peer discovery and 
make the peer-to-peer system independent from the physical network topology. 
Based on how the nodes in the overlay network are linked to each other, two 
general categories of systems can be identified in this respect: the unstructured 
and the structured networks.  
 
In structured peer-to-peer networks, peers are organized following specific 
criteria and algorithms, which lead to overlays with specific topologies and 
properties.  
 
Unstructured peer-to-peer networks do not impose any structure on the overlay 
networks. Peers in these networks connect in an ad-hoc fashion based on a 
loose set of rules. Ideally, unstructured peer-to-peer systems would have 
absolutely no centralized elements, but in practice there are several types of 
unstructured systems with various degrees of centralization. Three categories 
can easily be identified [27]: 
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 In pure peer-to-peer systems the entire network consists solely of 
equipotent peers. There is only one routing layer, as there are no 
preferred nodes with any special infrastructure function. 
 In centralized peer-to-peer systems, a central server is used for indexing 
functions and to bootstrap the entire system. Although it has similarities 
with a structured architecture, the connections between peers are not 
determined by any algorithm. 
 Hybrid peer-to-peer systems allow such infrastructure nodes to exist. 
 
Some advantages of Peer-to-peer networking over client–Server networking are 
[27]: 
 
 All the resources and contents are shared by all the peers, unlike server-
client architecture where server shares all the contents and resources. 
 Peer-to-peer is more reliable as central dependency is eliminated. 
Failure of one peer does not affect the functioning of other peers. In case 
of client–server network, if server goes down, the whole network gets 
affected. 
 There is no need for full-time system administrators. Every user is the 
administrator of his own machine. User can control their shared 
resources.  
 The overall cost of building and maintaining this type of network is 
comparatively very less. 
 
But peer-to-peer architecture has also some drawbacks over a client-Server 
one [27]: 
 
 In this network, the whole system is decentralized thus it is difficult to 
administer. That is, one person cannot manage by itself the whole 
network. Each user manages its node in the network.   
 Security in this system is lower. Virus and other malwares can be easily 
transmitted over this peer-to-peer architecture. 
 
 
1.3. Selfish peers and incentive mechanisms 
 
Peer-to-peer content distribution networks are powerful systems that use the 
bandwidth resources of their users. However, in those networks, the 
performance is highly dependent on the user's willingness to contribute with 
their bandwidth. Selfish users tend not to share their bandwidth and only want 
their own benefit. Some studies have showed that in the real peer-to-peer 
communities, a large number of peers become selfish if the system does not 
implement any kind of incentive mechanism. For example, in Gnutella more 
than 70% could behave as free-riders [21]. 
 
So peer-to-peer networks suffer from a fundamental problem of unfairness. 
Free-riders cause slower download times for others by contributing little or no 
upload bandwidth while consuming much download bandwidth. Cooperation is 
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a key to the success of a peer-to-peer system, but it is difficult to encourage 
without an incentive mechanism. 
 
In order to be successful, a peer-to-peer network has to be fair and, therefore, it 
has to implement an effective incentive mechanism. Fair bandwidth allocation in 
peer-to-peer systems can be difficult to achieve for several reasons [1]:  
 
 No central entity controls and arbitrates access to all resources. 
 The amount of bandwidth resources available is not known in advance 
and peers cannot be relied upon to specify their own resources honestly.  
 Strategic peers and free-riders may try to take advantage of the system 
by contributing little or nothing to the bandwidth, while consuming others’ 
resources. 
 
 
Developing an effective incentive mechanism is not an easy task. This implies a 
thorough statistical analysis of existing networks and their peers. Some 
attempts to address this fair bandwidth allocation problem may suffer from slow 
peer discovery, inaccurate predictions of neighbouring peers’ bandwidth 
allocations, underutilization of bandwidth, and complex parameter tuning. All 
this can lead to a worse or even an unusable network due to a bad incentive 
mechanism [1]. 
 
 
1.4. Incentives mechanisms to bring fairness 
 
 
Incentives play an inherently crucial role in a peer-to-peer system. Users 
generally wish to download their files as quickly as possible and since peer-to-
peer is a decentralized system, users are therefore free to attempt to 
strategically manipulate others into helping themselves to download faster. The 
role of incentives in peer-to-peer is to motivate users to contribute their 
resources to others so as to achieve desirable global system properties. 
 
Usually, the incentives are resources that the network can give to a peer in 
order to motivate it. Among others, some of these incentives can be [8]: 
 
 Uploading bandwidth: A local peer will divide his uploading bandwidth 
capacity between downloaders based on their contribution. Then, as 
much as the local peer contributes to the remote peer, the remote peer 
will reward it providing a bigger upload rate. 
 
 Number of peers per search: In peer-to-peer systems with an overlay, 
this is the number of remote peers that the system will provide to a peer. 
As much as the local peer contribute, the system will provide more 
remote peers location to provide him with a larger view of the network 
and therefore a better performance. 
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 Uncommon segments exchange: The peers revelation strategy dictates 
the piece revelation to a peer. Building an effective strategy will lead to 
reward the peers with high cooperation by providing them with 
uncommon pieces before than doing so to the other peers. 
 
 
1.5. Attacks related to unfairness in peer-to-peer  
 
Due to the decentralised nature of the peer-to-peer networks, the security in 
such networks tends to be a weak point. Some users exploit it in order to obtain 
their own benefit. Although there are several kinds of benefit from attacking a 
peer-to-peer system, one very extended is to obtain more resources from the 
system than the resources provided back to the system. 
 
 
1.5.1. Free-riding 
 
Particularly, for the content delivery peer-to-peer networks, Free-riding means 
to obtain great downloading rates while the contribution uploading to the 
network is little or nothing. Users acting that way are called free-riders [24]. 
 
Selfish users in a peer-to-peer network only want to consume resources of the 
network without contributing to the network in order to only improve their own 
performance. Peer-to-peer networks without an effective incentive mechanism 
will have a large amount of free-rider users and therefore they will suffer from 
very bad performance. 
 
Peer-to-peer networks with an incentive mechanism are more proof against 
free-riders. The main reason is that if a user wants to be a free-rider,  he not 
only has to modify their upload/download maximum ratios, he also has to use 
more complex tasks like to cheat to the incentive mechanism. It that point, it 
begins a battle between the free-rider users and the incentive algorithms. Here 
is the description of some types of attacks used by the free-rider users in a 
peer-to-peer network .  
 
 
1.5.2. The large view exploit 
 
The large view exploit is an attack used by free-rider users against peer-to-peer 
networks such as BitTorrent. The attack is based in a client that acquires a 
larger than normal view of a BitTorrent swarm and connects to all peers in its 
view. At the same time, the client does not upload any data to its peers while it 
downloads from all the peers connected to him. 
Experimental results demonstrates that the modified client can achieve better 
download rates than a compliant client in most common-case public torrents [7]. 
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1.5.3. The sybil attack 
 
Sybil attack is an attack against identity in which an individual entity 
masquerades as multiple simultaneous identities. In the context of peer-to-peer 
applications, that is to control multiple peers inside the swarm. A peer-to-peer 
incentive mechanism, has to manage to be proof to sybil attack. Otherwise, the 
incentive mechanism cannot work at all. With sybil attack, the attacker can be 
beneficiated obtaining better performance from attacking some mechanisms.  
 
 
Sybil 
attacker
 
Figure 1.2: Sybil attack in a peer-to-peer network: A unique user has achieved 
the control of several entities within the swarm 
 
 
A common example is in the bootstrapping mechanism. When a new peer joins 
the swarm doesn't have any block. In order to be able to begin to upload 
information, other peers will have to provide him with new blocks without having 
previous information about him. These peers will provide him blocks without 
expecting anything in return, before they realise that the new peer does not 
share anything at all.  
 
Therefore, an attacker can be generating new identities and for each of them, 
obtain a few blocks from other peers without nothing in exchange, and finally 
substitute this identity by another and begin the same procedure again. The 
result is that in a peer-to-peer system without a protection against the sybil 
attack, a peer can obtain the file without noting in exchange and with very good 
performance to him and causing a performance deterioration throughout the 
swarm. 
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1.5.4. Collusion 
 
The definition of collusion is an agreement between two or more peers, to limit 
open competition by deceiving, misleading, or defrauding others to obtain an 
objective by gaining an unfair advantage. Specifically in peer-to-peer networks, 
it means that colluders can cooperate with each other and artificially boost their 
upload-to-download ratios, thereby free-riding the system [22]. 
 
Collusion can  very effectively against peer-to-peer systems based on a shared 
reputation of the peers. If there are a large number of colluders in a system 
based on a shared reputation, the reputation of each peer can be altered 
providing the capacity to subvert the whole reputation system.  
 
Collusion is a critical issue in peer-to-peer applications. If a large portion of 
peers in a peer-to-peer system are colluders, the resource in the system will be 
over-exploited and the system could collapse. Note that a set of colluders can 
actually be one user who has created several colluding accounts. 
 
The effect of collusion is magnified in systems with cheap pseudonyms, where 
users can engage in the sybil attack, create fake identities and collude with their 
own multiple identities. 
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CHAPTER 2. INCENTIVES SCHEMES STUDY 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Having explained the context of the study, in this chapter is analysed the detail 
of the state of the art in terms of incentive mechanisms. The goal of this chapter 
is to identify the strengths and weakness of each algorithm.  
 
This survey analyses the main existing incentive algorithms classified about 
their characteristics at the present. The classification described is currently the 
most widely accepted classification within the research communities in incentive 
mechanisms. 
 
There is a number of reasons for users to contribute in a peer-to-peer system. 
Some of them offer resources in exchange for receiving other resources in the 
present or future time. Others may do so under threat of retaliation such as the 
expulsion of the community. Still others do so only out of altruism. 
 
In order to present the incentive mechanism, there has been classified 
depending on how they work. This classification consist on three main 
categories of schemes for addressing the free-rider issues. These are inherent 
generosity, reciprocity-based schemes and monetary payment schemes. 
 
 
2.2 Inherent Generosity 
 
The first category in which the incentive mechanisms are classified is the 
inherent generosity. This category include all the peer-to-peer systems in each 
peer contribute based only on its generosity. 
 
The file sharing networks such as eDonkey and Pruna are uploading and 
downloading inside established limits, but users can alter their applications to 
use the network more than they have been allowed.  
 
In order to analyse the behaviour of this kind of systems it exists a model 
framework that studies the phenomenon of free-riding in peer-to-peer systems 
[23]. The model is based on the insight that some users gain utility from the 
mere act of giving. It analytically determines the resulting percentage of free-
riders in the system based on the distribution of generosity in the population.  
 
They find that if the societal generosity is below a certain threshold, then there 
are too many selfish peers around and the system collapses. But if it exceeds 
the threshold, the contribution level increases in the societal generosity. 
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2.3 Reciprocity-Based Schemes 
 
This category includes the mechanisms based on reciprocity, meaning that 
each peer can download if he has uploaded previously. Each one maintain 
histories of past behaviour of other users and use this information in their 
decision making processes. 
 
This category is divided into two subcategories: direct reciprocity and indirect 
reciprocity. The first one, user A, decides how to serve user B only based on the 
service provided by B to A in the past. Instead of that, in indirect reciprocity 
schemes, the decision of A also depends on the service provided by B to other 
users on the system. 
 
 
2.3.1 Direct-reciprocity 
 
In direct-reciprocity schemes, each user maintains histories of past behaviour of 
other users and provides a service based on the service provided by each 
remote peer. There is no history shared among the users in the swarm.  
 
Direct-reciprocity schemes are suitable for applications with long lasting 
session, providing ample opportunities for reciprocity between pairs of users. 
 
Direct-reciprocity schemes do not need a central entity to control the incentive 
operation of the whole network. Each user maintains the history and competes 
in the system like in a market. It has to be able to determine which peers are the 
best to provide service in order to obtain the best service in return.  
 
In a decentralized incentive mechanism, sybil attacks can have direct 
consequences for peer-to-peer systems and are difficult to prevent. On the 
other hand, the decentralisation of the incentive mechanism reduces the costs 
and problems related to maintain a central entity. 
 
Literature in peer-to-peer incentives usually uses the Iterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma as a model for understanding cooperation. In the classical Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, two players choose simultaneously whether or not to cooperate. Each 
of the peers is rewarded if both cooperate, but at a lower rate than the penalty 
received if one cooperates and the other does not. Hence the dilemma: the 
rational choice of not cooperating leaves both worse off than if both had 
cooperated. 
 
The classical Prisoner’s Dilemma has to be adapted to the peer-to-peer 
environment. The model must be extended to more than two participants. It also 
has to be iterative, that is to play over and over during the session.  
 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma can be generalised as a payoff matrix in Table 1, in 
which depending on cooperation or defection of each peer, it assigns a payoff: 
R for reward, T for temptation to defect, S for sucker’s payoff, and P for 
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punishment for mutual defection. This payoff reﬂects the utility values earned 
after the exchange. 
 
 
 Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate R=3, R=3 S=0, T=5 
Defect T=5, S=0 P=1, P=1 
 
Table 2.1: Payoff matrix for the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 
 
Using the Prisoner’s Dilemma is possible to model players with different 
strategies on deciding how to act. In order to test and design new strategies 
computer tournaments are used in which every pair in a pool of players is 
subjected to repeated exchanges. 
 
Here it is important to define what is a Nash equilibrium: In game theory, a Nash 
equilibrium is a solution concept of a game between two or more players, in 
which each player is supposed to know the equilibrium strategies of the other 
players, and no player has anything to gain if only unilaterally changing its own 
strategy. 
 
In a Nash equilibrium each player has chosen a strategy and no player can 
benefit by changing its strategy and the other players keep their unchanged set 
of strategic options and the corresponding gains.  
 
It is important to note that a Nash equilibrium does not imply the achievement of  
the best overall result for the participants, but only the best result for each 
considered individually. It is perfectly possible that the outcome would be better 
for everyone if, somehow, the players coordinate their action. 
 
Within the peer-to-peer scope, therefore the Nash equilibrium is a point in the 
time where all the peers already know each other’s strategies and no one has 
anything to gain if only unilaterally change its own strategy. 
 
In a simulation environment with many repeated games, persistent identities, 
and no collusion, the Tit-for-Tat strategy dominates when the goal is the best 
result among all users. Instead, in a real network, with free-rider users using 
attacks, the issue is more complex. In Tit-for-Tat strategy, a peer will cooperate 
unless the remote peer defect. In case of defection in one round by the remote 
peer, the local peer will defect in the next round. 
 
Direct-reciprocity schemes are the incentive schemes in which more research 
efforts have been done. The most important mechanisms developed up to date 
are showed below. 
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2.3.1.1 Chocking and unchocking mechanism 
 
The chocking and unchocking mechanism is the incentive used in the official 
BitTorrent client implementation proposed by Bram Cohen [12]. The goal of this 
mechanism is to bring fairness to all users in the swarm and avoid free-rider 
users. 
 
The mechanism is based in two possible states of each connection with a 
remote peer: chocking (not uploading) and unchocking (uploading). A peer 
maintains the current download rates from all its links. Based on this 
information, it unchocks the b links with the highest download rates (b defaults 
to 7 or smaller). All the other links are choked except for one that is allowed by 
a mechanism called the optimistic unchocking, the purpose of which is to find a 
better link. The period of the optimistic unchocking should be sufficiently long 
(30 seconds in BitTorrent 4.0.0) so that this link may be put on the unchocking 
list of the other peer. If it downloads from this link at a higher rate than some of 
the b links, this new link replaces the link with the b-th highest rate. Otherwise, 
another link is chosen for the optimistic unchocking in a round-robin fashion. 
 
Some studies have shown that BitTorrent’s Tit-For-Tat  heuristic does not result 
in fair bandwidth exchange. Because it only identifies and exchanges data with 
a small number of peers at a time, a BitTorrent client may waste much time and 
bandwidth while discovering peers with similar upload rates in a large network 
[18]. 
 
In addition to the bad bandwidth allocation, it is vulnerable to some free-rider 
user attacks. Experimental test results show that the mechanism is susceptible 
to free riding [3]. Some studies show that bitTorrent is vulnerable to the Large 
view exploit [2]. This mechanism is also vulnerable to sybil attack. A peer can 
use multiple identities each of one asking for a block without upload nothing in 
back exploiting the optimistic unchocking mechanism. 
 
 
2.3.1.2 Tit-for-tat from the Iterated prisoner’s dilemma tournaments 
 
Seung Jun and Mustaque Ahamad investigated the incentive mechanism of 
BitTorrent and proposed a new incentive algorithm based on their experience 
on Iterated prisioner’s dilemma tournaments [3]. The algorithm proposed is the 
winning entry tit-for-tat of that tournaments. The goal of this mechanism is to 
bring fairness to all users in the swarm and avoid free-rider users. 
 
In this mechanism, peers maintain the upload amount u and the download 
amount d for each link. We can define the deficit of a link as u−d. If the constant 
c denotes the size of a fragment, a peer ensures that the deficit of every link is 
restricted up to a certain bound at any time:  
 
 
 u−d ≤ f ·c (2.1) 
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where f (≥ 1) is called a nice factor. Within this condition and the maximum 
upload rate allowed, the peer uploads evenly to all links as much as it can. This 
factor determines the amount that a peer is willing to risk for a chance to 
establish cooperation. Although neighbours may be tempted to take advantage 
of this nice peer, they will benefit more through the repeated exchange of 
fragments if they cooperate. 
 
Although this algorithm improves the incentive mechanism provided by the 
original BitTorrent implementation, it still has some drawbacks. It requires long 
round durations to estimate bandwidth contribution of the neighbouring peers, 
and wastes much bandwidth each round before discovering other contributing 
peers. This results in a bandwidth underutilization and it is also vulnerable to 
strategic clients. 
 
 
2.3.1.3 Strategic client: BitTyrant 
 
Piatek, Isdal, Anderson, Krishnamurthy and Venkataramani show that the 
incentive mechanism of the standard BitTorrent implementation is not robust to 
strategic clients. Through performance modelling parameterized by real world 
traces, they demonstrate that all peers contribute resources that do not directly 
improve their performance [18].   
 
They have modelled and analysed the BitTorrent's current incentive 
mechanism. They found that although the original algorithm of BitTorrent 
discourages free-riding, the dominant performance effect, in practice, is an 
altruistic contribution on the part of a small minority of high capacity peers and 
this is not a consequence of his chocking and unchcoking TFT algorithm. 
Selfish peers can significantly reduce their contribution and yet improve their 
download performance.  
 
They concluded that incentives in original BitTorrent algorithm do not build 
robustness. Instead of this, BitTorrent works well today simply because most 
people use client software as-is without trying to cheat the system. 
 
They use these results to drive the design and implementation of BitTyrant. 
BitTyrant can improve performance only due to more effective use of altruistic 
contribution of the other peers. So one BitTyrant client in a swarm full of original 
BitTorrent clients can improve its performance and harm the whole performance 
of the swarm. 
 
BitTyrant is a strategic BitTorrent client meaning his goal is not to provide 
fairness to the whole swarm but only to a client be a free-rider. 
 
2.3.1.4 TFT with Proportional Response algorithm 
 
Levin, LaCurts Spring and Bhattacharjee view BitTorrent as an auction instead 
of a tit-for-tat. With this point of view They show that the unchocking algorithm 
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of the BitTorrent standard implementation does not yield the fairness and 
robustness guarantees desired from such a system. With the goal of “the more 
you give the more you get", they investigate the use of a proportional share 
mechanism as a replacement to BitTorrent’s unchoker and creates the 
PropShare implementation [8]. 
 
The algorithm works as follows: PropShare runs an auction for a peer i's 
bandwidth and accepts the bandwidth offer from peer j as j's bid. Then peer i 
sends to j the proportional upload bandwidth taking into account all the remote 
peers and the total available upload bandwidth. It also uses a mechanism that 
reveals strategic blocks to the neighbours only enough to keep neighbours 
interested. 
 
The proportional Response algorithm provides several benefits in front of the 
previous algorithms. PropShare is Sybil attack proof and more collusion 
resistant and therefore it is more free-riding proof. 
 
 
2.3.1.5 Treat-Before-Trick 
 
Shin, Reeves and Rhee propose a method of preventing free-riding in peer-to-
peer systems based on cryptography [15]. This method, called Treat-Before-
Trick, is based on secret sharing. The goal of that mechanism is to provide 
fairness to the whole swarm and avoid free-ride users. 
 
The steps of Treat-Before-Trick are the same as those of the BitTorrent 
standard implementation, with the exception of key management. Peers are still 
assumed to use TFT and optimistic unchocking when determining how much 
resources to share.  
 
Treat-Before-Trick adds the secret sharing to BitTorrent: A file is divided into 
pieces, encrypted with a symmetric secret key, and then distributed to 
requesting peers along with subkeys generated. Peers must then swap file 
pieces for subkeys, which are needed in order to decrypt the file pieces. 
 
The use of secret sharing effectively counters known free-riding techniques, 
such as the sybil attack, while download time for compliant peers is heavily 
reduced. The computational cost and the extra bandwidth required for subkey 
exchange is not very high. However Treat-Before-Trick is subject to attack by 
malicious peers, who potentially disclose keys but do not profit themselves and 
collusion between free-riders (exchanging subkeys) is not prevented in current 
Treat-Before-Trick. 
 
2.3.1.6 Fair Torrent 
 
Sherman, Nieh and Stein presented a deficit-based distributed algorithm called 
FairTorrent [1]. The goal of this mechanism is to provide fairness to the whole 
swarm.  
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They realised that all the mechanisms based on direct reciprocity are rate-
based and suffer from a fundamental ﬂaw. First, they require long round 
durations to estimate bandwidth contribution of the neighbouring peers and 
waste much bandwidth in that. Second, they assume that a peer’s allocation 
measured in a given round is an accurate estimate of the future contribution 
from that peer and this assumption is problematic as each peer can change its 
allocation or even stop uploading to a given peer. 
 
A FairTorrent client uploads a data block to the peer it owes the most data and 
automatically converges to the individual reciprocation rates of its peers, without 
measuring or predicting these rates. FairTorrent runs locally at each peer and 
maintains a deficit counter for each neighbour who represents the difference 
between bytes sent and bytes received from that neighbour. When it is ready to 
upload a data block, it sends the block to the peer with the lowest deficit. 
FairTorrent does not require an estimate of neighbouring peers’ rate allocation. 
Therefore, it does not require rounds for discovering favourable peer sets. 
 
FairTorrent creators compared FairTorrent against BitTorrent, Azureus, 
PropShare and BitTyrant. They show that FairTorrent provides better degree of 
fairness, compared with other peer-to-peer systems. They also prove that 
FairTorrent is the algorithm with a better performance among the others 
compared with. Up to now FairTorrent is resilient to free-riders, low contributors 
and strategic peers. 
 
 
2.3.2 Indirect reciprocity 
 
 
In indirect-reciprocity schemes, users maintain a shared history of past 
behaviour of all the users. They provide a service based on the service provided 
in the past by each remote peer to the whole swarm. Indirect-reciprocity 
schemes are also called reputation-based schemes in the literature. 
 
The difference from the direct-reciprocity is the computation of reputation scores 
for each peer. These schemes have the ability to map the scores to strategies 
applied by the whole swarm. 
 
Indirect-reciprocity schemes are more scalable than direct-reciprocity schemes 
[22]. However, indirect-reciprocity schemes rely on second-hand observations 
and thus must confront trust issues that do not arise in direct-reciprocity 
schemes. Collusion can be very harmful to these peer-to-peer systems if they 
are not well handled. Colluded peers could alter the reputation of peers in the 
shared history of the swarm. 
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2.3.2.1 EigenTrust 
 
EigenTrust is not only an incentive mechanism but a complete reputation 
mechanism. Each peer is assigned a unique global trust value that reflects the 
experiences of all peers in the network with peer. In EigenTrust all peers in the 
network participate in computing these values in a distributed manner. 
 
The reputation value of each peer is not only based in the uploading and 
downloading rates. It includes other parameters such as if the peer has been 
sharing inauthentic files. The whole system takes actions against the malicious 
peers based on the reputation values such as isolate them from the network. 
 
EigenTrust tries to provide the fairness to the swarm. However EigenTrust has 
many drawbacks. It is vulnerable to collusion and to the sybil attack. A group of 
peers can lie about the reputation of a peer. Moreover, the distributed 
computation and management of the reputation is very complex and it causes 
computation and bandwidth overheads. 
 
 
2.3.2.2 FOX 
 
FOX is a file-sharing protocol which incentive mechanism is based on an 
overlay structure [14]. This overlay structure build a logical topology in which the 
peers are placed. Each peer will only be able to share information with their 
immediate neighbours. 
 
 
FOX's structured topology provides a means for peer to punish nodes both 
upstream and downstream from it. The FOX topology is restructured in a cyclic 
way. When a peer is no sharing as it should, it will be punished moving it on the 
topology. 
 
FOX provides optimal download times when everyone cooperates and punishes 
free-riders. However it has some drawbacks: reforming the structure causes 
overheads and peers must wait for a new restructuring to even have the 
possibility of punishing free-riders. Moreover, FOX is unnecessarily strict, as 
there may be highly provisioned nodes that are willing to give much more to the 
system as long as they can download more, but FOX does not provision for this. 
 
 
2.4 Monetary-based schemes 
 
The last category of methods to prevent free-riders from downloading is the 
Monetary-based scheme. In this category each downloader should pay the 
downloading fees for resources they consume and there must be a public key 
infrastructure to add an economic system to the network. 
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Monetary schemes provide a mechanism to exchange tokens by blocks of 
information. It allows individual users to make a profit by uploading more than 
they download and the other way around it allows an individual to pay for 
download without upload requirements. However, they have a notable 
drawback: It is high complex since they require an infrastructure for accounting 
and micropayments. 
 
 
2.4.1 Dandelion 
 
Dandelion is a monetary-based ﬁle distribution protocol that uses currency and 
key exchanges through a centralized server to provide incentive for sharing 
across different downloads [13].  
 
Dandelion system is reminiscent of BitTorrent. However, Dandelion uses a 
different incentive mechanism. It employs a cryptographic scheme for the fair 
exchange of content uploads for credit, the content provider is able to redeem a 
client’s credit for monetary rewards. Thus, it provides strong incentives for 
clients to seed content. 
 
Cryptographic scheme provides Dandelion with free-rider robustness and 
makes the system proof to most of the attacks such as sibyl attack and 
collusion. However, it has the drawbacks associated to a monetary scheme: a 
centralised infrastructure for accounting and micropayments and the complexity 
because of the cryptographic scheme. 
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CHAPTER 3: USED TECHNOLOGIES AND SCENARIO 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Having realised a deep analysis of the state of the art of the algorithms of 
incentives existing today, now it is pretended to build an scenario that allow to 
compare experimentally different algorithms. In this chapter, the scenario of 
tests developed and the technologies used are described. 
 
The scenario used is based on virtualization. In a physical machine, a test 
scenario has been created. In this scenario, the peer-to-peer network elements 
are virtual, intending to look as much as possible to reality by performing the 
same operations than a real peer-to-peer network.  
 
In order to obtain the results in equal conditions and be able to use different 
algorithms together, the tests have been conducted using the same peer-to-
peer protocol. In this case, BitTorrent has been used due to the fact that its 
specification is free to use and it exists a large number of clients which 
implement different algorithms of incentives. 
 
3.2 BitTorrent architecture 
 
BitTorrent is a protocol supporting the practice of peer-to-peer file sharing and is 
used to distribute large amounts of data. BitTorrent is one of the most common 
protocols for transferring large files in Internet. Programmer Bram Cohen, a 
former graduate student in Computer Science Major by the University at 
Buffalo, designed the protocol in April 2001 and released the first available 
version on July 2nd, 2001. BitTorrent clients are available for a variety of 
computing platforms and operating systems. 
 
 
In order to be able to mount the peer-to-peer testbeds, BitTorrent requires the 
presence of a tracker. A tracker is a server that assists in the communication 
between peers using the BitTorrent protocol. A tracker maintains all the peers 
belonging to the swarm identified. Clients are required to communicate with the 
tracker to initiate downloads. After that, when clients have already begun 
downloading, they also communicate with the tracker periodically to negotiate 
with newer peers and provide statistics. However, after the initial reception of 
peer data, peer communication can continue without a tracker. 
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Figure 3.3: Tracker operation 
 
 
In particular for these tests, the BitTornado tracker has been used. BitTornado 
has been run in a machine dedicated to this role in all the testbeds done. In the 
testsbeds, when a machine starts the BitTorrent client, it loads the torrent file 
containing the information about the file and the tracker. With this information, 
the client contacts with the tracker and registers itself as a peer in the swarm. 
The trackers gives to the client the list of the other peers already registered in 
the swarm. 
 
 
3.3 Netkit 
 
Netkit [29] is a self-contained environment developed by the Roma Tre 
University that makes it easy and costless to emulate complex network 
configurations on a single host machine in order to perform networking 
experiments. It allows creating several virtual network components that can be 
easily interconnected in order to form a network on a single PC. Interconnected 
machines may be organized to form a laboratory, which can be used to emulate 
the behaviour of a particular service or protocol. 
 
Netkit, in itself, is an open source project aiming at integrating different other 
open source products. It is heavily based on the User Mode Linux (UML) variant 
of the Linux kernel. The purpose of this Netkit is to solve many of the difficulties 
and technicalities that a user could have in using UML for networking. 
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Figure 3.4: Netkit architecture (Roma Tre University) 
 
 
Netkit virtual nodes can be interconnected between them using virtual hubs. 
This virtual hubs are a colision domain that allows to connect the network 
interfaces of the virtual machines. This virtual hubs can be also connected to 
the real world using virtual interfaces "tap" witch connects the virtual hub with a 
virtual network interface of the host. 
 
In order to carry out the experimental tests, several virtualization technologies 
have been compared in terms of features, performance, licensing and simplicity 
of use among others. The virtualization products proposed were Vmware, 
Virtual Box, Xen and Netkit with UML. The easy to use and the open source 
license of use of Netkit with UML tipped the balance in favor of Netkit with UML. 
It was also important the scriptable way to build and boot an entire scenario 
used in Netkit. 
 
Regardless the benefits explained above, for the purpose of simulating peer-to-
peer networks, Netkit suffers from a significant limitation. Netkit does not allow 
running applications with graphical user interfaces. This limitation prevents from 
using some peer-to-peer clients in which the graphical user interface is needed 
for running. Therefore, all the peer-to-peer systems tested here are able to run 
without the graphical user interface. 
 
The Netkit version used in all the test beds is the version 2.8, the latest version 
available as of publication time. 
 
A very interesting feature of Netkit performing the tests has been the Netkit 
labs. A Netkit lab is a set of preconfigured virtual machines that can be started 
and halted together. This feature of Netkit has allowed to preconfigure the 
scenarios and then re-run the experiment as many times as needed. The way in 
which these scenarios are defined is by using configuration files for the 
elements in the scenario. In annex 3 are detailed the configuration of the 
scenarios created for the experiments. 
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3.4 User-mode Linux 
 
User-mode Linux allows to run several guest Linux kernels as a process within 
the normal Linux kernel (host). As each guest is just a normal application 
running as a process in user space, this approach provides the user with a way 
of running multiple virtual Linux machines on a single piece of hardware. 
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Figure 3.5: Execution levels using UML 
 
 
Virtualization plays a fundamental role in development and testing applications.  
In User-mode Linux each guest machine runs as application in user space 
giving to the user the total control of that machine. That is why User-mode Linux 
is very useful to test and debug new software, as well as in teaching and 
research.  
 
User-mode Linux is the technology in which Netkit is based. Netkit takes 
advantage of this powerful technology improving it to offer a very useful 
framework for a teaching and researching in networks. 
 
When a User-mode Linux machine is booted, it starts to use a filesystem. This 
filesystem is contained in a file on the host machine and it is a block device. 
UML block devices can be layered, with a read-only device having a copy-on-
write (COW) read-write device on top of it. This acts as a single read-write 
device, with the modifications to the read-only layer being recorded in the read-
write COW layer. This allows multiple machines to share a filesystem, allowing 
a large saving in disk space on the host. 
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Figure 3.6: Figure Input / Output Operations on a Block Device with COW 
 
 
In order to perform the testbeds, a unique filesystem for all the machines has 
been created. This filesystem is based on the filesystem provided with Netkit on 
its version 5.2 and it has been modified as it is described in the ANNEX 2. It 
contains all the software needed: The peer-to-peer clients, tracker, tools, etc. 
 
 
3.5 Hardware 
 
The hardware used to run the laboratories has been a personal computer with 
the following characteristics: 
 
 
Processor Intel Core i5-2500 Quadcore 3,30 GHz 
Memory 8 GB of DDR3 SDRAM 
S.O. Ubuntu Linux 12.04 LTS – Linux 3.2.0-37 x86_64 
Storage 140GB 
 
Table 3.2: Hardware specifications 
 
 
It is important to see here that the hardware characteristics of the infrastructure 
in which Netkit will run are a determinant limitation. Although the system used 
here is not a low performance desktop, this hardware will limit the number of 
virtual machines that can be running at the same time on the testbed.  
 
In order to be sure that the performance of each virtual machine does not affect 
to the results of the testsbeds, some performance tests with virtual machines 
running peer-to-peer software have been performed. Due to the results 
obtained in these tests, a limitation of 15 machines running at the same time 
has been imposed on the testbeds. 
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3.6 Other tools used 
 
Tc [31] and Wondershaper [32] have been used in order to limit the bandwidth 
capacities of the peers to perform the different tests. Tc is used to configure 
Traffic Control in the Linux kernel. Traffic Control consists of shaping, 
scheduling, policing and dropping traffic. Wondershaper provides an easy way 
to configure the traffic parameters of Tc using scripts.  
 
Tcpdump [33] has been used to capture the traffic in the network. Tcpdump is a 
packet analyser that runs under the command line. It allows the user to 
intercept and display TCP/IP and other packets being transmitted or received 
over a network to which the computer is attached. Distributed under the BSD 
license, tcpdump is free software. With Tcpdump in the “Analysis tools” 
machine, all the traffic has been captured and stored in a .cap file.  
 
Wireshark [34] has been used to analyse the dumps stored in the .cap files and 
generated with tcpdump. Wireshark is a packet analyser used for network 
troubleshooting, analysis, software and communications protocol development, 
and education. Wireshark is very similar to tcpdump, but has a graphical front-
end, plus some integrated sorting and filtering options. It also allows generating 
statistics information about the traffic captured. 
26  An Analysis of incentives mechanisms and evaluation on BitTorrent 
CHAPTER 4: EXPERIMENTAL TESTS RESULTS 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
In order to evaluate and compare the peer-to-peer algorithms some tests have 
been performed. These tests intend to compare the algorithms in terms of 
fairness, resilience to strategic peers and convergence time. In this chapter the 
results of the experimental tests are presented. In order to obtain very easy to 
see conclusions, the results are presented in charts.   
 
4.2. Fairness Evaluation 
 
The aim of the first experiment is to compare the different algorithms in terms of 
fairness. For a one peer, we could define fairness as the relation between the 
quantity of information uploaded and downloaded [14]. As much as this relation 
approaches to one, the protocol is fairer. Azureus (Standard BitTorrent 
implementation) (section 2.3.1.1), BitTyrant (section 2.3.1.3), FairTorrent 
(section 2.3.1.6) and PropShare (section 2.3.1.4) have been evaluated in this 
first experiment.  
 
In order to compare the fairness, a laboratory for each studied protocol has 
been set up. Each one is comprised by a set of machines located in the same 
network with different roles: 
 
 2 peers with the whole file acting as seeders 
 8 peers without the file acting as leechers 
 1 machine with tracker role 
 1 machine where the analysis tools runs 
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Figure 4.7: Fairness evaluation scenario 
 
 
The seeders have a bandwidth capacity of 100KiB/s of uploading. Each leecher 
has a download capacity of 100KiB/s and the upload capacity is uniformly 
distributed between 10KiB/s and 60 KiB/s. These bandwidth rates reflect a 
typical scenario of users with asymmetric Internet connections with a bigger 
download capacity than upload capacity. 
 
In this laboratory, leechers begin downloading simultaneously and remain as 
seeds in the system upon download completions. For each leecher, the average 
uploading rate has been compared with the average downloading rate from 
others leechers. This relation is presented below in very easy to see charts. In 
order to obtain the minimum sample results, the experiment has been run 
several times. The bandwidth usage measurements have been done using  
tcpdump and Wireshark. 
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Figure 4.8: Azureus fairness evaluation chart 
 
Figure 4.9: BitTyrant fairness evaluation chart 
 
Figure 4.10: PropShare fairness evaluation chart 
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Figure 4.11: FairTorrent fairness evaluation chart 
 
 
As defined before, fairness is the relation between the quantity of information 
uploaded and downloaded. As this relation is closest to one, we can say that is 
fairer. So, in the charts: the more close to the line y=x the results are, the fairer 
is the algorithm. 
 
In the charts the red line is the line y=x so it is the ideal. The points marked in 
blue are the results of the different measurements done.  
 
In terms of fairness, another interesting point would be to check with which 
other peers a peer collaborates, and to what extent is he collaborating.  In order 
to be able to do so, a series of matrices has been built. These matrices show 
the total number of bytes uploaded by peers to each other, averaged over all 
runs. Darker squares represent more data. 
 
 
Figure 4.12: Azureus fairness evaluation matrix 
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Figure 4.13: BitTyrant fairness evaluation matrix 
 
Figure 4.14: PropShare fairness evaluation matrix 
 
Figure 4.15: FairTorrent fairness evaluation matrix 
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Thanks to the resulting charts and matrix, is easy to get some interesting 
conclusions. We can say that the FairTorrent is the algorithm fairer as it has 
almost all the points over the ideal line. In the case of Azureus, it’s showed that 
the algorithm benefits those that share less in detriment of those who share 
more. 
 
 
4.3. Resilience to strategic peers 
 
The aim is to compare the response of the different algorithms against a free-
rider user that uses a strategic client. The goal of this testbed is to compare the 
resilience of the Azureus (section 2.3.1.1), FairTorrent (section 2.3.1.6) and 
PropShare (section 2.3.1.4) clients. 
 
In order to do so, a scenario similar to the fairness experiment is used. This 
scenario is comprised of a swarm in which all nodes are sharing a file. All nodes 
use the same peer-to-peer algorithm except a node in which the strategic client 
BitTyrant is used. The download times for free-riders users with strategic node 
are compared with the download times of the rest of peers. Thereby it can be 
seen how the algorithm performs in a swarm in which free-riders nodes are 
present. 
 
In order to compare the resilience, a laboratory for each studied protocol has 
been set up. Each one is comprised by a set of machines located in the same 
network with different roles: 
 
 2 peers with the whole file acting as seeders 
 7 peers without the file acting as leechers 
 1 peer acting as leecher running the BitTyrant client 
 1 machine with tracker role 
 1 machine where the analysis tools run 
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Figure 4.16: Resilience evaluation architecture 
 
 
The seeders have a bandwidth capacity of 100KiB/s of upload. Each leecher 
have a download capacity of 100KiB/s and a upload capacity of 20 KiB/s. The 
strategic client has the same network capacities than the other leechers. This 
bandwidth rates reflects a typical scenario of users with asymmetric Internet 
connections with a bigger download capacity than upload capacity. 
 
In this scenario, leechers begin downloading simultaneously and remain as 
seeds in the system upon download completions. The experiment has been run 
several times and for each leecher, the download time has been computed 
using tcpdump and Wireshark. 
 
The download times are presented below in a very easy to see chart. This chart 
shows for each experiment the average and the range of the download times for 
both the strategic client and the algorithm tested. 
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Figure 4.17: Average and range of the download times of BitTorrent and other 
algorithms competing 
 
 
 
Another interesting point of view are the sharing data matrices. These matrices 
show the total number of bytes peers uploaded to each other, averaged over all 
runs. Darker squares represent more data. Peers 1 to 3 are seeds, peer 4 is the 
strategic peer and the other peers are leechers. 
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Figure 4.18: Azureus resilience evaluation matrix 
 
 
Figure 4.19: PropShare resilience evaluation matrix 
 
 
Figure 4.20: FairTorrent resilience evaluation matrix 
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Although there is not a huge difference, because the number of peers in the 
swarm is low, the chart shows clearly different behaviours among the three 
algorithms compared here. In the first case, the BitTyrant peer achieves better 
download times than the other users who are using Azureus. Furthermore, the 
Azureus sharing matrix shows how the peer 4 obtains more data from other 
leechers than the other peers do. This matrix also shows how this peer 
contributes with less information to the other peers. In this case we can say that 
Azureus is vulnerable to the free-rider strategies of the bitTyrant client. These 
results are in line with the conclusions of the paper made by the authors of 
BitTyrant as discussed in chapter 2 of this report, in the BitTyrant section. 
 
On the other hand, in the PropShare and FairTorrent scenarios, the results are 
different. Both of them achieve better download times than BitTyrant. The 
PropShare sharing matrix shows that the strategic peer 4 has been penalised 
by the other leechers and therefore it has needed to obtain more data from the 
seeds. In the FairTorrent sharing matrix, this behaviour is more prominent. In 
both cases, PropShare and FairTorrent scenarios, the strategic peer BitTyrant 
has being punished by the algorithm on the other leechers because of his free-
rider behaviour. These results are also in line with the respective conclusions 
from chapter 2 of this report. 
 
 
4.4. Convergence time of each algorithm 
 
As we have seen before in the direct-reciprocity section on chapter 2, the Nash 
equilibrium is a point in the time where all the peers already know each other’s 
strategies and no one has anything to gain if they only change their own 
strategy unilaterally. In the Nash equilibrium the best result for each peer 
considered individually is achieved. 
 
The goal of this testbed is to compare among the algorithms the time needed by 
the algorithm to achieve the equilibrium. We are looking for the convergence 
time of the algorithm. Azureus (Standard BitTorrent implementation) (section 
2.3.1.1), BitTyrant (section 2.3.1.3), FairTorrent (section 2.3.1.6) and PropShare 
(section 2.3.1.4) have been evaluated in this experiment. 
  
In order to do so, each algorithm has been executed in a testbed several times. 
For each peer in the swarm, we will consider that the peer has arrived to the 
equilibrium when it reaches a download rate of at least 90% of his maximum 
upload rate configured. Therefore, we will consider the convergence time as the 
time between the moment when the node first contacts the tracker and when 
the node arrives to the equilibrium. 
 
The scenario built to compare the converge time of the different algorithms is 
comprised by a set of machines located in the same network: 
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 3 peers with the whole file acting as seeders 
 8 peers without the file acting as leechers 
 1 machine with tracker role 
 1 machine where the analysis tools runs 
 
Leechers
Seeders Tracker
Analysis 
tools
 
 
Figure 4.21: Convergence time evaluation scenario 
 
 
The seeders have a bandwidth capacity of 100 KiB/s of uploading. Each leecher 
has a download capacity of 100 KiB/s and the upload capacity is uniformly 
distributed between 10 KiB/s and 60 KiB/s. These bandwidth rates reflect a 
typical scenario of users with asymmetric Internet connections with a bigger 
download capacity than upload capacity. 
 
In this laboratory, leechers begin downloading simultaneously and remain as 
seeds in the system upon download completions. In order to obtain the 
minimum sample results, the experiment has been run several times. The 
bandwidth usage measurements have been done using  tcpdump and 
Wireshark. 
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Figure 4.22: Figure Rate convergence 
 
 
As defined before, the convergence time is the time that a peer needs to reach 
a downloading rate at least 90% of its maximum download rate configured. 
The figure shows the cumulative frequency analysis of the time needed by the 
peers to obtain the equilibrium.  
 
Thanks to the resulting charts, we can conclude that FairTorrent is the algorithm 
which needs less time to converge among the algorithms compared. The 
differences showed in this chart are not too large. That is because the swarms 
are very small due to the limitations imposed by the testbed infrastructure in 
which we cannot run testbeds with a very large number of peers due to 
performance issues. In real swarms where the number of peers are ten times 
larger than the used here, the differences between the algorithms would be 
larger. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
 
As they are presented in the introduction of this report, there were two main 
goals to be accomplished in this thesis. The first one was to analyse the state of 
the art related to the different existing algorithms detailing their characteristics 
and profits according to their authors, and provide a classification by 
characteristics of the algorithms.  
 
The second important goal was to build an scenario where different peer-to-
peer algorithms could be experimentally tested and compared. Those scenarios 
were supposed to be capable to obtain experimental results allowing to 
compare several algorithms among others and confirm the results obtained in 
the theoretic comparative. The experimental results had to allow verify or deny 
the presumed profits provided by each algorithm. 
 
At this point we can affirm that all the goals presented at the beginning of the 
thesis have been accomplished throughout the chapters. A strict analysis of the 
state of the art has been provided. The different algorithms have been classified 
taking into consideration the methods to inventive the peers. 
 
After the theoretical analysis, a functional scenario to test some algorithms has 
been built. The scenario built has allowed to test different BitTorrent clients 
implementing different incentives algorithms in order to be able to confirm or 
deny the most important features. The presented scenario is not a very realistic 
swarm, since it is comprised by very few nodes. However, the tests are real 
clients running in a virtualization environment and not only simulations, what 
means that the results obtained are not perfectly strict, but the results that we 
would obtain performing the same test in the real world swarms will be in the 
same line that the ones obtained here. 
 
In the experiments, several algorithms of the type Direct-reciprocity have been 
tested under a BitTorrent network. Those algorithms are the most interesting 
type due to their simple way of working and thus their interoperability with other 
clients. In the experiments, fairness, resilience to strategic peers and 
convergence time has been evaluated. These test results provide a good vision 
of the incentive algorithms quality and allow to compare the algorithms between 
them. 
 
Both in the study of the literature and in the experimental results, FairTorrent is 
the algorithm with better results: compared to other peer-to-peer systems, 
FairTorrent’s deficit-based algorithm provides a high degree of fairness, a better 
performance and a fast convergence rate. It was also seen that FairTorrent is 
resilient to free-riders, low contributors and strategic peers. FairTorrent does not 
require a centralized system, peer reputation, or third-party credit-keeping 
services, making it very simple. 
 
Both, the comprehensive study of the state of the art and the experimental 
tests, have allowed us to identify not only real but also supposed benefits, which 
ended up not being as important as their creators considered. The results 
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obtained in the experimental part have been in line with the results of the 
literature analysis. 
 
 
5.1. Environmental impact 
 
This thesis is related to improvements in the peer-to-peer networks by 
improving its incentives algorithms. The environmental impact of this changes in 
the algorithms by itself is minimum.  
 
Despite the foregoing, the impact of the infrastructures bellow the peer-to-peer 
networks is large. Peer-to-peer networks usually run over Internet. Here we 
have to consider all the hardware across the world to support Internet. This 
large quantity of hardware has an important impact in terms of energy 
consumption. Servers need energy to be build, they need energy to run and 
they need energy to be refrigerated inside the datacentres, among other energy 
consumption throughout its life. Therefore the carbon footprint related to this 
energy consumption is high. Some studies indicate that in 2012, between 2% 
and 3% of total world's emissions were due to Internet [25]. 
 
The fraction of the total Internet bandwidth used by peer-to-peer networks is so 
large. Besides that, the use of peer-to-peer traffic is growing dramatically, 
particularly for sharing large video/audio files and software. This is because of 
the great success of the peer-to-peer networks on Internet.  
 
The success of the peer-to-peer networks is because they work well. That 
means that improving this networks incentivize people to use more and more 
these networks. This implies more bandwidth consumption and therefore more 
hardware needed consuming energy. 
 
Related to the environmental impact, we can conclude that maybe at first sight 
to improve an algorithm has a minimum impact. But an analysis a little bit far 
shows us that a little change in an algorithm can have a large environmental 
impact. But not all is bad, we also should notice here that the use of data 
networks minimizes the impact the technology it replaces, some of them with a 
larger footprint. 
 
 
5.2. Future work 
 
To carry out experimental tests, a virtualization platform called Net-kit has been 
used. In the future, those tests could be extrapolated into a real platform of 
simulations of peer-to-peer and even data could be extracted from peer-to-peer 
swarms. This way, it could be possible to carry out a much more strict 
experimental evaluation.  
 
In terms of the development of new algorithms, we can continue researching on 
the presented methods of incentives. Algorithms can be improved so that they 
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improve on performance, fairness, security and computational cost. It is also 
possible to keep investigating in combining different methods at the same time 
and see if those combinations can bring even more improvements. Finally, we 
can also combine incentive methods with other methods to different purposes 
such as peer authentication, to check if combining them would bring benefits.  
 
In the more generic field of peer-to-peer, it is necessary to continue working on 
improving the security of the system, preventing the spread of viruses and 
malware and avoiding the bad content identification within the network. Another 
field with a lot of possible improvement is the search of content algorithms 
within the peer-to-peer network. 
 
 
5.3. Personal approach 
 
The execution of this thesis has provided me with a lot of knowledge in different 
fields and technologies. First of all, the initial study made me acquire knowledge 
about the peer-to-peer technology and the different algorithms of incentives. 
 
Apart from the knowledge related to the peer-to-peer technology, the 
experiments gave me new knowledge of a range of fields like virtualisation 
technologies for Linux, the Linux operative system, the tools for traffic analysis, 
etc. During the execution of the experimental tests several problems appeared, 
whose identification and resolution where crucial during this learning. 
 
The use of Net-kit with the Linux User-Mode technology has allowed me to build 
up a test scenario that could be repeated as many times as it was needed, 
thanks to the management layer of automatization of laboratories included with 
Net-kit. But Net-kit has also some drawbacks. Netkit does not allow running 
applications with graphical user interfaces. Such a limitation prevents from 
using peer-to-peer clients in which the graphical user interface is needed for 
running. Another point has been the difficulties encountered to build the 
scenario. Net-kit has some problems related to working with those applications 
that have a high use of memory like the Java virtual Machine. That has affected 
during the filesystem building phase and the running of the virtual machines. 
Some fine tuning configuration related to this issue was performed to overcome 
those problems. These configuration parameters, detailed in the ANNEX 2, 
were necessary to be able to build the test scenario. 
 
TC is a very powerful tool to control traffic. This tool, combined with the 
simplicity of use provided by Wondershaper, has been very useful and effective 
to limit the bandwidth of the peers. 
   
The powerful tool Wireshark in combination with tcpdump has been very useful 
to obtain a detailed view of the network traffic. Wireshark includes a lot of 
appropriate tools to extract stats to generate the experimental results. 
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Apart from the knowledge related to technologies, the execution of this thesis 
has provided me with a lot of new knowledge regarding to methodologies, 
processes, work organization and a long etcetera. 
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ANNEX 1: NETKIT SET-UP 
 
Starting from Netkit version 2, consists of three different packages: 
 
1. The Netkit "core", which contains commands, documentation and other 
stuff which is necessary for Netkit to work. 
2. The Netkit filesystem, which contains the filesystem for virtual machines. 
3. The Netkit kernel, which contains the kernel used by virtual machines. 
 
Netkit is installed in 3 steps: 
 
 
 Step 1: Download and unpack 
 
Download all the files to a directory of your choice. Then unpack them by 
using the following commands: 
 
 
#tar -xjSf netkit-x.y.tar.bz2 
#tar -xjSf netkit-filesystem-Fx.y.tar.bz2 
#tar -xjSf netkit-kernel-Kx.y.tar.bz2 
 
 
Once Netkit has been unpacked, no root privileges are required to 
configure it and start working. 
 
 
 Step 2: Configuration 
 
The first step is to set the environment variable NETKIT_HOME to the 
name of the directory Netkit has been installed into. In order to access 
the Netkit man pages, the MANPATH variable must be set to 
":$NETKIT_HOME/man". For example, assuming that you have installed 
Netkit to /home/foo/netkit and that your shell is bash, you would use the 
following commands: 
 
#export NETKIT_HOME=/home/foo/netkit 
#export MANPATH=:$NETKIT_HOME/man 
 
It may also be useful to put these lines inside your shell initialization file 
(`.bashrc' in case you are using the bash shell). 
 
After doing this, you need to update your PATH environment variable to 
include the path to the standard Netkit commands. This is required in 
order to make Netkit work properly. The entry you need to add to the 
PATH is "$NETKIT_HOME/bin". For example, assuming Netkit is (still) 
installed into /home/foo/netkit and that your shell is (still) bash, you would 
type: 
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#export PATH=$NETKIT_HOME/bin:$PATH 
 
Again, it may be convenient to put this line inside your shell initialization 
file. 
 
 
 Step 3: Checking the configuration 
 
At this point, change the current directory to the Netkit directory: 
 
#cd netkit 
 
Now, run the `check_configuration.sh' script by typing: 
 
#./check_configuration.sh 
 
This script takes care of checking whether your system is configured 
properly to make Netkit run. Any misconfigurations are signalled and 
instructions for fixing them are reported as well. If the script exits with 
success, then Netkit is ready for use. 
 
 
After the installation of the Netkit, in order to test whether Netkit is working 
properly, you can start a simple virtual machine by issuing the command: 
 
#vstart pc1 
 
If everything is in place, you should see a new virtual machine starting up 
(eventually popping up an Xterm window) and the command `vlist' on the host 
machine should show an output similar to the following: 
 
#vlist 
 
USER  VHOST     PID   UPTIME       SIZE  INTERFACES 
foo     pc1   24102   00:03       12376 
 
Total virtual machines:    1    (you),     1    (all users) 
Total consumed memory: 12376 KB (you), 12376 KB (all users) 
 
 
You can stop the virtual machine by typing the following command on the host 
machine console: 
 
#vhalt -r pc1 
 
 
You can now delete the file pc1.log. 
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As an additional feature, users of the bash shell can take advantage of 
command line auto completion for Netkit commands. In order to activate it, first 
of all make sure your shell is bash: 
 
#readlink -f $SHELL 
 
 
If it is, then you can safely add the following line at the end of your ~/.bashrc 
file: 
 
#. $NETKIT_HOME/bin/netkit_bash_completion 
 
Annex 2: Modifying the filesystem in Netkit   51 
ANNEX 2: MODIFYING THE FILESYSTEM IN NETKIT 
 
 
The Netkit filesystem is an image of an installed Debian GNU/Linux distribution 
including several packages that can profitably be used within a network 
emulation. 
 
A virtual machine filesystem is a special file on the host machine. There exists a 
single model filesystem that is shared by all the virtual machines and provides 
the full suite of tools.  
 
To prepare the different laboratory scenarios, the filesystem provided in Netkit 
has been modified in order to include all required packages. Below are detailed 
all the modifications done in the standard filesystem provided by Netkit its 
version 5.2. 
 
To modify the filesystem, a virtual machine booted with the option -- no-cow has 
been used. A virtual machine over Netkit uses a base filesystem which is not 
modified during the execution and another file for each virtual machine in which 
all the file modifications are being done. The --no-cow option allow being able to 
modify directly the base filesystem. These modifications will affect all the virtual 
machines booted in the future. 
 
In order to have access to Internet, a tunnel to the host machine with the option 
--eth0=tap,X,X has been used. 
 
In order that some commands work properly, the virtual machine memory has to 
be extended to 512 MBytes. The option used to extend the virtual memory for a 
virtual machine is --mem=512. 
 
Finally, the command to boot a machine to modify the filesystem has been the 
one showed below: 
 
#echo “nameserver 8.8.8.8” >> /etc/resolv.conf 
 
After that, the apt packages have to be updated and it is required to add the key 
in order to authenticate the source of the packages: 
 
#apt-get update 
#gpg --keyserver pgpkeys.mit.edu --recv-key 
AED4B06F473041FA 
#gpg -a --export AED4B06F473041FA | apt-key add - 
#apt-get update 
 
The Java Virtual Machine and the Ant packages are required for run the Azureus 
Client: 
 
#apt-get install openjdk-6-jdk 
#apt-get install ant 
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In order to avoid some errors, the java heap space has been increased: 
 
#export ANT_OPTS="-Xmx512M" 
#apt-get install zip 
 
In order to limit the bandwidth and simulate a real network environment 
between the servers, Wondershaper is used. Wondershaper is a script to limit 
the ethernet connection bandwidth that uses the Linux tc command and makes 
it easier to use. 
 
#apt-get install wondershaper 
#ln -s /sbin/orig-tc /sbin/tc 
 
 
 
Clients installation in the Netkit filesystem: 
 
 
The first client installed was FairTorrent which is based on Azureus and it also 
includes the possibility to run the standard BitTorrent algorithm using the 
standard Azureus implementation. 
 
To install the FairTorrent client is has to be downloaded from the official 
webpage. After the download, it has been checked the md5 hash and then 
decompressed: 
 
#wget 
http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~asherman/fairtorrent/downloads/FairTorrent_1.1.1.tgz 
#tar -zxvf FairTorrent_1.1.1.tgz 
#ant 
 
To install the BitTyrant client, it has to be downloaded from the official webpage. 
After the download, it has been checked the md5 hash and then decompressed: 
 
#wget 
http://coblitz.codeen.org:3125/bittyrant.cs.washington.edu/
#dist_010807/BitTyrant-src.zip 
#apt-get install unzip 
#unzip BitTyrant-src.zip 
#ant 
 
Bitthieft 
 
#wget http://bitthief.ethz.ch/dist/linux/BitThief.tgz 
#tar -zxvf BitThief.tgz 
 
PropShare 
 
#wget 
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#http://www.cs.umd.edu/projects/propshare/propshare_src.tar.gz 
#tar -zxvf propshare_src.tar.gz 
#ant 
 
 
Tracker Installation in the Netkit filesystem: 
 
Finally a bitTorrent tracker has been installed. A tracker provides with remote peers 
to all the clients of the swarm. The tracker chosen was bittornado due to its 
simplicity and its console mode. 
 
 
To install bitTornado: 
 
#apt-get install bittornado 
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ANNEX 3: NETKIT LABORATORIES CONFIGURATIONS 
 
Netkit with its labs feature, allows to build scenarios and to re-run the 
experiments as many times as needed. A Netkit lab is a set of preconfigured 
virtual machines that can be started and halted together. This annex contains 
an explanation about how a Netkit lab is built and the specific configurations of 
the scenarios used in each experiment. 
 
Netkit allows to build scenarios in two ways: 
 As a single script using the commands to execute virtual Machines 
 By using laboratory configuration files. 
 
In this case the second option has been used. In this option, Netkit requires a 
directory tree with the above elements: 
 
 a lab.conf file describing the network topology. 
 a set of subdirectories that contain the configuration settings for each 
virtual Machine. 
 .startup and .shutdown files that describe actions performed by virtual 
machines when they are started or halted. 
 [optional] a lab.dep file describing dependency relationships on the 
startup order of virtual Machines. 
 [optional] a _test directory containing scripts for testing that the lab is 
working correctly. 
 
When a laboratory directory tree is created, it can be easily booted by the 
command lstart. 
 
Some examples of this configuration files used in the experiments are included 
above: 
 
 Lab.conf file: In this file, several machines connected to the same virtual 
hub “A” have been defined. The mem parameter is also used in order to 
create the virtual machines with more memory than the standard. This is 
because using the standard amount of memory, some pieces of software 
produced errors due to a lack of memory resources. Finally, it also 
includes some descriptive information about the laboratory: 
 
 
LAB_DESCRIPTION="Fairness LAB" 
LAB_VERSION=1 
LAB_AUTHOR="D. Serra" 
 
pc1[0]="A" 
pc2[0]="A" 
pc3[0]="A" 
pc4[0]="A" 
pc5[0]="A" 
pc6[0]="A" 
pc7[0]="A" 
pc8[0]="A" 
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pc9[0]="A" 
pc10[0]="A" 
pc11[0]="A" 
pc12[0]="A" 
pc13[0]="A" 
pc14[0]="A" 
pc15[0]="A" 
pc100[0]="A" 
pc101[0]="A" 
 
pc1[mem]=512 
pc2[mem]=512 
pc3[mem]=512 
pc4[mem]=512 
pc5[mem]=512 
pc6[mem]=512 
pc7[mem]=512 
pc8[mem]=512 
pc9[mem]=512 
pc10[mem]=512 
pc11[mem]=512 
pc12[mem]=512 
pc13[mem]=512 
pc14[mem]=512 
pc15[mem]=512 
pc100[mem]=512 
pc101[mem]=512 
 
 
 startup.conf file: This file defines the commands to be executed after the 
virtual machine booting. Here are some examples depending on the 
machine role: 
 
o Tracker: The first thing to do is to configure the network interface 
by ifconfig command. After that, it executes the tracker with the 
proper parameters to listen in the 6969 standard BitTorrent 
protocol among others: 
 
 
 
ifconfig eth0 10.0.0.100 netmask 255.255.255.0 broadcast 10.0.0.255 up 
 
bttrack --port 6969 --dfile ~/.bttrack/dstate --logfile 
~/.bttrack/tracker.log --nat_check 0 --scrape_allowed full &  
 
 
o Seed peer (in this case, using the FairTorrent client):  
 Using ifconfig command the network interface is configured. 
 With the mkdir command, a directory that will contain the 
data file to be shared is created. 
 With the command ln, a link to the data file source is 
created: /hosthome/10MBfile.txt. In Netkit virtual machine 
the /hosthome directory is where the /home/ directory of the 
host machine is mounted. That allows to access the host 
files from the virtual machine. A link is created in order to 
avoid to copy the whole file to the virtual machine. 
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 The torrent file containing the hash of the file to be 
downloaded has been copied from the host using the 
/hosthome/ directory by the cp command. 
 Using wondershaper, the maximum upload and download 
rates have been established. 
 Finally the peer-to-peer client has been executed with the 
torrent file as a parameter. 
 
 
ifconfig eth0 10.0.0.1 netmask 255.255.255.0 broadcast 10.0.0.255 up 
 
mkdir /root/FairTorrent/dist/my_dir/ 
ln -s /hosthome/10MBfile.txt /root/FairTorrent/dist/my_dir/10MBfile.txt 
cp /hosthome/10MBfile.txt.torrent /root/FairTorrent/dist/my_dir/ 
 
wondershaper eth0 8200 100 
 
cd /root/FairTorrent/dist/ 
java -jar /root/FairTorrent/dist/Azureus2.jar --ui=console 
/root/FairTorrent/dist/my_dir/10MBfile.txt.torrent </dev/null >&/dev/null & 
 
 
o Leecher peer (in this case, using the FairTorrent client): This file is 
the same as the seed one except by the command ln. A leecher 
peer does not have the data file to be shared at the beginning: 
 
ifconfig eth0 10.0.0.10 netmask 255.255.255.0 broadcast 10.0.0.255 up 
 
mkdir /root/FairTorrent/dist/my_dir/ 
cp /hosthome/10MBfile.txt.torrent /root/FairTorrent/dist/my_dir/ 
 
wondershaper eth0 8200 100 
 
cd /root/FairTorrent/dist/ 
 
java -jar /root/FairTorrent/dist/Azureus2.jar --ui=console 
/root/FairTorrent/dist/my_dir/10MBfile.txt.torrent </dev/null >&/dev/null & 
 
 
o Analysis tool: This machine role is in charge to analyses all the 
communications during the sharing process. At the beginning, the 
network interface is configured using ifconfig. Then, the network 
capture is launched using tcpdump tool: 
 
 
ifconfig eth0 10.0.0.101 netmask 255.255.255.0 broadcast 10.0.0.255 up 
 
tcpdump -i eth0 -s 65535 -w /hosthome/lab25.cap 
 
 
